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FUNDAMENTALISMS AND EUROINTEGRATION: 
THE CASE OF BULGARIA 
This text lays no claim to offering a politological analysis. Its aims are: 
• to describe the actual state of religious coexistence at the Balkans and, more 
specifically, in Bulgaria following the accession of the country to the European 
Union in 2007; and 
• to outline certain tendencies in the progress of the relations between the State 
and the Church, on the one part, and between the different religious communi-
ties, on the other. 
So, when fundamentalisms are concerned, we should always specify the meaning of 
this notion. We all know that it has been coined by the radical Protestant circles in the 
USA toward the end of the nineteenth century but, of course, the religious phenomena 
it encompasses have their long-standing historical prototypes (not only these of Chris-
tianity but of Judaism and Islam as well – to restrict our subject to the three most popu-
lar monotheistic religions). Most schematically stated, fundamentalism should be 
viewed as „a religious way of being” determined by a strategy according to which 
believers encircled by alien religions attempt at preserving their distinctive iden-
tity as a people or religious community under the menace of modernity and the 
transition to a secular way of life1. Early manifestations of fundamentalism can be 
traced as far back as the time of the Babylonian Exile (Deuteronomy 7), and after, the 
prophets Ezra and Nehemiah for the first time held extremely orthodox attitudes bor-
dering upon xenophobia. (Ezr.10, Neh.) Defending religious identity that has been 
shaken during the Exile justified itself as a reason for aggressive inculcation of the 
norms of everyday behaviour in the believers which (for the first time in recorded his-
tory) exemplified the confrontation between own and alien in respect to religion and 
matched the Infidel with the Enemy. 
In fact, without entering into historical details, we may summarize that such funda-
mentalist movements always emerge in situations of identity crisis when shattered 
identity strives for consolidation through the expressions and instruments of religion. 
This has been valid for the situation in pre-Reformation Europe when the profound 
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M. R u t h v e n, Fundamentalism: The Search for Meaning, Oxford University Press, 2004, pp. 247].  
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crisis within the Catholic Church paralleled the tendency of differentiating the society 
from the influence of the Church. The Reformation itself (and in a way, the Counter-
Reformation as well), in this sense, represents an attempt of Christianity to regain its 
lost positions and establish itself in the context of upcoming modernity. 
The situation in the Arab World has also been similar when during the first decade 
of the eighteenth century Abd ul-Wahhab started his reformatory preaching with the 
aim to turn Islam to the purity of faith from the times of Mohammed and emancipate it 
from the influence of sufism that (in his opinion) has led believers off the right way to 
Allah and has engrossed them in pagan and polytheistic deviations2. 
The forms in which religious fundamentalism manifests itself in various religious 
contexts show definite „familial similarities”. In the beginning, it refers only to defend-
ing the purity of faith from various deviations that are inescapable in the course of 
entering any religion into everyday life and folklore. The criticism in this case is ad-
dressed primarily to the faithful and their imperfect or insufficient faith3. While in ho-
moreligious context, fundamentalists – with their entire radicalism – remain rather 
confined within ultraconservatism. 
Things change when such views get into an alien confessional circle. In the Penta-
teuch (Numbers, 25), strict adherence to religious duties was identified with rejection 
of any variant faith, and this has led to direct aggression upon the carriers of otherness. 
The idea that God’s commandments propagandizing tolerance and love for fellow crea-
tures are valid namely and only in respect to these fellow creatures (i.e., the faithful in 
the closest sense) but are not binding in respect to representatives of other religions, 
has its expressions both in the Judeochristian tradition and the Islam. The adherence to 
the fundaments of faith proved to be related with aggressive rejection of otherness, and 
this is precisely where the problem of contemporary religious fundamentalisms lies. 
However, today I have no intention to bother you with the various historical and 
contemporaneous manifestations of religious fundamentalism. I will outline only the 
situation at the Balkans, and more specifically in Bulgaria, in order to make an attempt 
at explaining how eurointegration enters into disaccord with some of the important 
tendencies in the religious life of its citizens. 
It is obvious that modern Europe has set itself to the important task of finding and 
regulating the „right” place of religion in the life of various communities. The tradi-
tional view of religion as an institution separated from the state and, therefore, irrele-
vant from the viewpoint of its regulatory mechanisms, has obviously yielded to the 
pressure of actual realities4. If after signing the Treaty of Rome in 1957 it seemed that 
                                                        
2 http://www.sufi.it/Islam/wahlast.htm Breve storia del movimento wahhabita; http://www.globalsecu-
rity.org/military/world/gulf/wahhabi.htm 
3 For example, Wahhabis instituted the principle of „takfir”, i.e. the right of a Muslim to accuse another Mus-
lim of defection – to declare his apostasy: a sin which according to the Sheriat is subject to death penalty without 
charge or trial. The most conservative interpretations of Wahhabi Islam view Shiites and other non-Wahhabi 
Muslims as dissident heretics. Only two years after their alliance, Ibn Saud and Wahhab accused all neighbouring 
Muslim tribes of apostasy and initiated a djihad against these – See CRS Report RS21695, The Islamic Traditions 
of Wahhabism and Salafiyya, by Febe Аrmanios; as for the acute clashes of various Christian branches, there is no 
need to admonish of these here, I think. 
4 Cf. J. C a s a n o v a, Religion, European secular identities, and European integration, Eurozine, 
http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2004-07-29-casanova-en.html 
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western European societies have undergone a rapid, drastic, and seemingly irreversi-
ble process of secularization5, today it is hardly possible to deceive ourselves any more 
– religion is at all not on the way of extinction from our „civilized”, „modern”, and 
„integrated” societies but, on the contrary, it acquires more and more influence and 
paradoxically proves out to be of dramatic importance in modern world. Where does 
the paradox come from? 
The place of religion in any of the EU countries is regulated by the respective con-
stitution; there are also specific auxiliary laws regulating the rights of the citizens to 
confess their religious beliefs and perform the related rituals. In the first decades of EU 
development, when the major goal has been to establish a common market economy to 
the profit of all participants, one of the necessary „victims” has been the past full of 
conflicts and disputes, including religious ones. The design of EU as a space, artifi-
cially and purposefully „deprived” of common historical memory – a space where the 
common (interests, goals) is highlighted, and the variance (history, identities, values) is 
kept silent – proved to be an extremely successful economic experiment. It proved out 
that history and the related (contradictory) identities could only shake the common 
ambition of Europeans to produce and sell more and better. However, the „fathers of 
Europe” – having started from the market, indeed – have always aimed something 
more than just a market. By definition, united Europe should be a space of common 
values – and when speaking about values, the presence of religious ethics can be hardly 
neglected. 
So, the question is whether there are indeed common values that should make a whole 
of Europeans, and to what an extent these values have been prompted by religion? 
The first thing we can note is that, at least for now, the community of market has 
not proved itself as a sufficient condition for the emergence of a common identity. The 
social tissue intertwined in trade and business has not at all turned into a European 
people; the growing bulk of populist and nationalist movements anywhere speaks 
rather in favour of the reverse tendency. 
On the other side, the accession of the ten new EU members in 2004 for example 
confronted Europe with the interesting problem of how to manage the religious radical-
ism of Polish citizens who showed themselves as greater extremists in their Catholic 
confession than the moderate „old Europeans” who had long ago secularized their 
thinking and behaviour. And if such a problem (although charged with relatively minor 
conflicts) could exist within Catholicism, then how do things look like from the per-
spective of Orthodox Bulgaria? 
Bulgaria is the second Orthodox country that has accessed to the EU, following 
Greece that had its accession in 1981. Of course, the terms of the Greek accession at 
that time strongly differ from these of the present day; the accession treaty of Greece 
has been aligned with the Greek constitution. Article 3, section 2, of the Greek consti-
tution reads as follows: 
„Every known (?) religion is free and the forms of worship therein shall be prac-
ticed without any hindrance by the state and under protection of the law. The exercise 
of worship shall not contravene public order or offend morals. Proselytizing is prohib-
                                                        
5 Ibidem. 
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ited.” The 1975 Constitution, which is consistent with all of its predecessors, identifies 
only the Orthodox Church, and the Jewish and Muslim religions as known religions, or 
as „legal persons of public law.” All other religions are considered „legal persons of 
private law,” and as such, they have no legal personality; indeed, the Catholic Church 
was not extended the status of „legal personality of private law” until 19996. The une-
qual status of all non-Orthodox religions in Greece has led to a continuous and very 
ardent debate regarding religious liberties and the options for practicing these liberties7. 
And while Greeks try to assure Europe that they do not restrict the rights on non-
Orthodox churches, but the Greek case helps to specify the nature of Orthodoxy’s am-
bivalence towards pluralism, in the form of a gap between support for the legal-
constitutional, or formal(ist) rights of freedom of religion and conscience, on the one 
hand, versus contradictions in the interpretation and application of those rights in 
a substantively expansive manner, on the other8, the next two Orthodox countries  
– Bulgaria and Romania – accessed to the Union. In their cases, the accession treaties 
were also aligned with the constitutions. But how are things arranged in my country? 
I will consider only the case of Bulgaria. 
After the fall of the Communist regime in 1989, as in most former socialist states, 
we were also witnessing an intensive come-back to Christian religious values, institu-
tions, and traditions. But as the Bulgarian Orthodox Church was going out of the dec-
ades of totalitarianism with a heavy burden of accusations of collaborationism with the 
authorities and for more than a decade was struggling to overcome its own schism9, for 
long it was not successful in taking the lead of these processes. Thus, the re-
Christianization occurred mainly at the level of everyday life and was often a form of 
expressing a political (equal to anti-Communist) stand. Even the leaders of the Socialist 
Party were quick to re-orientate and began to show at the temples during major church 
festivals in an attempt at re-integrating themselves within the currently adopted forms 
of socialization. All this happened at the background of the rapid intrusion of all kinds 
of previously unknown for the ordinary believers Christian (but non-Orthodox) and 
non-Christian preachers who aggressively and successfully disseminated their teach-
ings thus giving ground to the talk about the religious diversity not ever seen in the 
                                                        
6 Е. П р о д р о м у, Православното християнство и плурализмът [В:] И. М е р д ж а н о в а (съст.), 
Религия и политика на Балканите, С., ДЕМОС, 2004, с. 191–228; с. 199. [E.H. Pr o d r o m o u, Orthodox 
Christianity and Pluralism: Moving Beyond Ambivalence? [In:] Religion and Politics in the Balkans, 
I. M e r d j a n o v a (ed.), DEMOS Foundation, 2004, pp. 191–228] I wish to express my gratitude to the publish-
ers who granted me the chance to use the English original. 
7 see summarized results from the discussion in: E. P r o d r o m o u, Some Notes on Religion, State, and De-
mocracy: The Unexceptional, Yet Instructive, Case of Greece, January 23, 2002 – http://www.bu.edu/-
cura/programs/working%20papers/Prodromou%20lecture.htm 
8 Е. П р о д р о м у, Православното християнство и плурализмът, с. 191–228; с. 194. [E.H. P r o -
d r o m o u, Orthodox Christianity and Pluralism: Moving Beyond Ambivalence?, p. 194]. 
9 The schism within the Bulgarian Ortodox Church began in 1992 with the dispute on the legitimacy of the 
election of Patriarch Maxim and the accusation of collaborationism with the totalitarian regime laid against him. 
The establishment of an alternative Synod led to a severe conflict on all levels in the Church, and also to disorien-
tation and religious scepsis among the laity. The schism formally ended up with the decisions of the All-Orthodox 
Council of all East Orthodox patriarchs held in Sofia in 1998 but the conflict endured. The adoption of the new 
Law on Confessions in 2002 did not solve the problems because of ambiguous formulations. For details cf. 
http://www.pravoslavieto.com/docs/razkol_chronology.htm#71 (used on 25 September 2007). 
 25
Bulgarian setting till those days. Naturally, the traditional massive presence of Islam 
also underwent a peculiar development which I will discuss in more detail. 
First and foremost, it is necessary to note that Islam has been present in the relig-
ious mosaic at the Balkans since the end of the fourteenth century and, what’s more, in 
a quite specific form. As far back as the sixteenth or seventeenth centuries, there are 
data for a significant „coupling” among the everyday, popularized confessional forms 
of Christianity and Islam. The lacking conditions for controlling the „purity of faith” 
on the part of the subordinated Christian church led to a large-scale decline of clergy 
literacy at all levels and made impossible the administration of a strict norm in respect 
to the dogma and ritual practices. Thus folklorized Christianity at the Balkans entered 
into various, in respect to forms and results, interactions with similarly „leveled down”, 
folklorized Islam (often represented by semi-Orthodox Dervish and Sufi orders with 
quite a significant presence of Shiitic elements allowing of cults that in their forms and 
meaning bordered upon Christian ones10). The resulting „alloy” of folkloric Christian-
ity and folkloric Islam presents one of the explanations both for the success of the cen-
tury-long „creeping islamization” at the Balkans and for the relatively peaceful co-
existence of the two otherwise confronting religions in the region. Only the radicaliza-
tion of religious preaches both on the part of the Orthodox Church and the Islam, used 
most frequently as an outer cover for genuinely political purposes, will lead – in pres-
ent days, regretfully – to a real religious confrontation. (Ethnoreligious conflicts in 
former Yugoslavia are a dismal example of that.) 
In the years following 1989, the attitude toward Muslims in Bulgaria is bearing the 
sign of the depressing memory of the so-called „renaissance process” – the attempt at 
forcefully renaming Bulgarian citizens of Islamic confession initiated at several time 
points from 1970s to 1990s and terminated dramatically with a large-scale emigration 
of approximately one million Bulgarian citizens of Turkish descent during the summer 
of 1989. Experiencing probably a somewhat collective sense of guilt before their Mus-
lim countrymen and facing the requirement to prove their belonging to modern demo-
cratic Europeans, politicians allowed of the establishment of the so-called Movement 
for Rights and Liberties – a political party of ethnic and religious background that since 
the first free democratic elections in Bulgaria, in 1990, is always presented in the Bul-
garian Parliament and is acting as a protector of the confessional rights of Bulgarian 
Muslims. MRL possesses serious political impact and, as a coalition partner, is playing 
a key role in the two most recent Bulgarian cabinets. Along with political representa-
tion, Islamic religious preaching of a new type made itself evident. Replacing the 
everyday Islam that has been for so long traditional for the Balkans, a rather more radi-
cal modification of this teaching began to spread out. Often this is realized with the 
                                                        
10 cf. details on the specificity of Islamic presence at the Balkans in: Н. Г р а м а т и к о в а, Ислямски 
неортодоксални течения в българските земи [В:] Р. Г р а д е в а  (изд.), История на мюсюлманската 
култура по българските земи. (= Съдбата на мюсюлманските общности на Балканите, т. 7) С., 2001, 
с. 192–285. [N. G r a m m a t i k o v a, Islamic non-orthodox trends in Bugarian lands (Based on written sources 
and Fieldwork) [In:] History of Muslim Culture in Bulgarian Lands, R. G r a d e v a  (ed.) (= The Fate of Muslim 
communities in the Balkans, Vol. 7), Sofia 2001, p. 192–285.] as well as in: Р. Г р а д е в а, С. И в а н о в а  
(съст. и ред.) Мюсюлманската култура по българските земи. (= Съдбата на мюсюлманските общности 
на Балканите, т. 2) С., 1998 [Muslim Culture on Bulgarian lands, R. Gr a d e v a, S. I v a n o v a  (ed.), (= The 
Fate of Muslim communities in the Balkans, Vol. 2), Sofia 1998.] 
 26
financial support of certain Arab countries sponsoring the construction of a multitude 
of mosques11 and the establishment of schools for young Islamic theologians in remote 
Bulgarian regions where these schools often function without regulation and control on 
the part of the Bulgarian Ministry of Education and Science. The graduates from these 
schools are granted the option of a free-of-charge extension of their education at higher 
theological schools in the Arab World from where they come back to initiate their ac-
tivity as imams in the Rhodopes or Northeast Bulgaria, the regions with the most com-
pact Muslim population in the country. It is quite interesting that there they often clash 
with their adult fellow Muslims while accusing them of insufficiently strict adherence 
to the norms and canons required from the faithful. A specific generation gap is on the 
way, and the tendency there is not toward religious tolerance such as it is expected 
from „secularized Europeans with democratic thinking” but rather gravitating to relig-
ious fundamentalism that, for the time being, fortunately remains within the Muslim 
community and does not develop into aggressive acts upon „infidels” outside this 
community – at least at an official level. 
As for the Orthodox Church, it spends too much energy in mastering its own intrin-
sic conflicts and is practically a passive observer of what is going on in the society  
– the altered character of Islamic religious preaching, the dissemination of non-
Orthodox and non-Christian teachings. But is this passivity a sign of the secular atti-
tude of the Church in respect to the State that is so much desired in Europe? 
The Bulgarian constitution adopted in 199112 states that (Art. 13, 3) „Eastern Or-
thodox Christianity is considered the traditional religion in the Republic of Bulgaria” 
thus preserving a privileged position for Orthodoxy and relieving the Bulgarian Ortho-
dox Church of the requirement to register according to the stipulations of the Law of 
Religions. Тhis overemphasis on Orthodoxy does not correspond to the principles of 
democracy and pluralism adopted by the European Union. Similarly to the Greek case 
two decades ago, this provokes reactions on the part of the Council of Europe as well 
as of various human rights organizations. 
The new Denominations Act adopted on 20 December 2002 intended to solve the 
problem13. It really made a step forward in the religious sphere. At the same time, its 
Art. 10 did not bring reconciliation in the religious sphere. It grants ex lege recognition 
to the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, while prescribing court registration to the other 
religious denominations. According to Art. 10, 
(1) The traditional denomination in the Republic of Bulgaria is Eastern Orthodoxy. It has a his-
torical role for the Bulgarian State and is of actual importance for the state life. Its voice and rep-
resentative is the autocephalous Bulgarian Orthodox Church that under the name ‘Patriarchate’ is 
the [legitimate] successor of the Bulgarian Exarchate and is a member of the United, Holy, Ecu-
menical and Apostolic Church. It is governed by the Holy Synod and represented by the Bulgar-
ian Patriarch, who also is the Metropolitan of Sofia; 
                                                        
11 Also in regions inhabited predominantly by Alevis who, in general, do not perform their religious ceremo-
nies in mosques. 
12 Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria (Official Gazette of the Republic of Bulgaria, No. 56/1991) 
http://www.hri.ca.partners/forob/e/INSTUMENTS/europe/bulgaria.htm 
13 Law of Religions (Official Gazette of the Republic of Bulgaria, No. 120/2002) http://dev.eurac.edu: 
8085/mugs2/do/blob.htmi?type=html&serial=1042646751401 An English translation of the Denominations Act of 
2002 is available in: www.relgionandpolicy.org/show?p+1.1.292 
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(2) The Bulgarian Orthodox Church is a judicial entity. Its structure and government are estab-
lished by its statutes; 
(3) Clauses 1 and 2 shall not serve as a ground for offering privileges or any advantages by a law. 
Despite its objection by the Council of Europe and various human rights organiza-
tions14, the mentioned article had the support of most Bulgarian statesmen. They also 
referred to the interpretation given by the Constitutional Court on February 18, 1998 
that „the traditional nature of Eastern Orthodoxy expresses its cultural and historical 
role for the Bulgarian state, as well as its present significance for the state life and es-
pecially by its impact on the system of official holidays15.” The defenders of the ex 
lege recognition, however, have omitted the different meaning that the new bill gives to 
the mentioned constitutional text. It is no more Eastern Orthodoxy that is defined as 
„traditional religion” in accordance with the 1991 Constitution, but the Orthodox 
Church, i.e. a particular religious institution16. 
In the comfortable situation of being the only privileged religious institution in Bul-
garia, the Bulgarian Orthodox Church shows still more astonishing passivity regarding 
its proper involvement with believers and society. Onlookers might take that as a „cor-
rect” and „European adequate” secular behaviour but, in practice, Orthodox flock un-
doubtedly would prefer having a church expressing a more unambiguous attitude both 
on dogmatic and on confessional or charitable aspects of Orthodoxy. Elementary cate-
chization is acutely lacking, and most Bulgarians declaring their belonging to the Or-
thodox confession have quite a vague or no idea of the religious doctrine essentials as 
well as of the required behaviour of an Orthodox believer and of the canonical forms of 
the cult. In a word, Orthodoxy in Bulgaria is existing in the form of semi-paganism, 
semi-folklore, semi-canonic liturgy – all this in spite of the fact that 82.6%17 of the 
Bulgarians state with conviction their Orthodox confession and declare their adherence 
to Eastern Orthodoxy because of its undisputable historical contributions for the differ-
entiation and preservation of the ethos. I would say that Bulgaria is the last place in the 
world where the emergence of Orthodoxic fundamentalism could be expected (at the 
moment, unfortunately, there is no time to consider the very interesting features of the 
Russian, Greek, and Serbian models of Orthodoxy). 
Within this setting, it is still more surprising that in the course of the last several 
months officials of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church demonstrated extreme religious 
intolerance (I wonder why such a behaviour should not be termed „fundamentalism”) 
both in the estimate for the behaviour of their own flock and in respect to non-
Orthodox Christians. 
                                                        
14 See the PACE Resolution 1390 (2004) available in: http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/AdoptedText/ 
TA04/ERES1390.htm. 
15 Prof. N e n o v s k i, Our Church Is ‘Registered’ by the Constitution, Trud [newspaper „Labor”] from De-
cember 23, 2002, p. 26. 
16 For more details on the subject see S. D e v e t a k, L. K a l č i n a  and M.F. P o l z e r, Legal Position of 
Churches and Religious Communities in South-Eastern Europe. Collection of articles, selected relevant legal texts 
and other sourses, Ljubljana–Maribor–Vienna 2004, as well as И. М е р д ж а н о в а  (съст.), Религия 
и политика на Балканите. С., 2004. [Religion and Politics in the Balkans, I. M e r d j a n o v a  (ed.), DEMOS 
Foundation, 2004]. 
17 cf. Appendix – data of the National Statistical Institute for the confessional structure of the population in 
Bulgaria according to the 2001 census. http://www.nsi.bg/Census/Census.htm, used on 25 September 2007. 
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On 7 March this year, Bulgarian media announced the unprecedented decision of 
a priest from the town of Sliven who excommunicated a female gynecologist because 
of the abortions she had performed. Purposeful abortions are, of course, prohibited 
according to the canons of the Orthodox Church; as far back as the end of the nine-
teenth century, all kinds of medicine-women and healers who performed abortions with 
the aids of traditional medicine have been sanctioned for that. But till present, the 
Church has never entered into polemics on abortions with the official modern medi-
cine. This subject is a (tolerant and secular) taboo in modern Bulgarian history, and in 
the second half of the twentieth century Bulgarian healthcare had much greater 
achievements in this field than most of the other „secularized” European countries. 
Violating the taboo, the Church for the first time – and, moreover, inappropriately 
– tried to actively play the role that till present it had abandoned in all circumstances  
– that of a universal sanction of the everyday behaviour of the believers. 
Still more alarming are the rude acts of intolerance demonstrated at an official level 
toward Catholicism and its supreme representative, the Pope. In the first half of Febru-
ary, the newly ordained metropolitan of Plovdiv – Nickolay – gave a series of inter-
views in the media in which he qualified the Pope as an heretic and thus explained the 
fact that during the visit of the Pope John-Paul the Second in Bulgaria, in 2002, he 
(Nickolay) had withheld the Pope from entering into the temple of Saint Alexander of 
Neva because, according to him, this would have required a new consecration of the 
temple thus desecrated. 
Of course, it is easy to say that here it refers to an unweighed expression of personal 
opinion although the significance of its public announcement by a clergyman taking an 
important administrative position within the Church could hardly be denied. Moreover, 
the Catholic Church with its traditional presence within Bulgarian territories18 is maybe 
the least aggressive and is undoubtedly the most tolerant of the non-Orthodox churches 
disseminating their teachings in Bulgaria at present. It has directed its efforts almost 
entirely in organizing charitable activities thus (paradoxically), at least to a certain 
extent, filling in the social vacuum due to the passivity of the Orthodox Church. If the 
long-waited „awakening” of the Orthodoxy and its taking an active stand on the actual 
topics of the time will be manifested in such unacceptable acts, its former lethargic 
passivity may appear preferable to someone, for this passivity, looked from the outside, 
successfully camouflages the calm, distant, and secularized religious institution ex-
pected by the EU. Furthermore, the Bulgarian Orthodox Church in no way stands 
against the really dangerous for the society forms of religious propaganda in the coun-
try but is transferring to the State the entire care and responsibility to do so... 
To summarize: at this stage, the successful eurointegration of Orthodox countries 
requires from both sides to diminish the differences between Orthodoxy and the tradi-
                                                        
18 cf. a review of the opinions and reference texts in: В. Г ю з е л е в, Кратък очерк върху отношенията 
между Римската църква и Българското царство през Средновековието (IX–XIV в.) [В:] Католическата 
духовна култура и нейното присъствие и влияние в България, С., 1992, с. 71–84 [V. G y u z e l e v, An Out-
line of the Relations between Roman Catholic Church and the Bulgarian Kingdom during the Middle Ages (IX– 
–XIV c.) [In:] Catholic Ecclesiastical Culture and Its Presence and Influence in Bulgaria, Sofia 1992, pp. 71–84] 
as well as recently in: С. Е л д ъ р о в, Католиците в България 1878–1989, С., 2002 [S. E l d a r o v, Catholics 
in Bulgaria 1878–1989, Sofia 2002]. 
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tional confessional forms for Christian Europe (Catholicism and Protestantism). This is 
manifested as a „denial of conflict”, i.e. tolerance is replaced by diligently „beating 
around the bush” and keeping silence about possible controversies, all this leading in 
the long run to the disregard of Otherness – maybe nurtured by the illusion that un-
named realities are less real. And all this is happening in the context of increasing 
global tension between Christianity and the Islam. The search for „political” solutions 
is once again made with painstaking avoidance of direct religious formulations of the 
problems and reduction of the variance to „cultural” and „ethnic”, but – for God’s 
sake! – not religious differences, because religion has been led away of political insti-
tutions as far back as the end of the eighteenth century. 
I believe it is high time to admit that what is acutely lacking in Europe of today is 
precisely the dialogue between religions. An enduring and good-willed dialogue, with-
out aggressive inculcation of opinions but also without disregarding the variance; 
a dialogue in which every side would have the chance to formulate its proper position 
in respect to the believers and society just here and now, and namely in the perspective 
of the desecularization of the world that we are presently witnessing. If Peter Berger is 
right saying that modernity brings about not secularization but pluralism19, then the 
attempt of the EU to force Orthodox World into the niche of (silent) secularism is 
doomed. Our chance is in learning to speak about our religious differences and in pre-
paring to live with these. 
 
APPENDIX 
Population according to confessions and years of census 
Confession 1910 1920 1926 1934 1946 1992 2001 
 Count 
Population 
Total 4 337 513 4 846 971 5 478 741 6 077 939 7 029 349 8 487 317 7 928 901 
Eastern Ortho-
doxy 3 643 918 4 062 097 4 569 074 5 128 890 5 967 992 7 274 592 6 552 751 
Islam 602 078 690 734 789 296 821 298 938 418 1 110 295 966 978 
Catholicism 32 150 34 072 40 347 45 704 – 53 074 43 811 
Protestantism 6 335 5 617 6 735 8 371 – 21 878 42 308 
Judaism 40 067 43 232 46 431 48 398 43 335 2 580 653 
Armenian-
Gregorian 12 259 10 848 25 402 23 476 – 9 672 6 500 
Other 706 371 1 456 1 802 79 604 15 226 7 784 
No affiliation – – – – – – 308 116 
  Structure – % 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Eastern Ortho-
doxy 84.0 83.8 83.4 84.4 84.9 85.7 82.6 
Islam 13.9 14.3 14.4 13.5 13.3 13.1 12.2 
                                                        
19 П. Б ъ р г ъ р, Десекуларизацията на света, С., 2004, КХ. [Cf. also the English original: The Deseculari-
zation of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics, P.L. B e r g e r  (ed.), Grand Rapids, Mich.: William 
B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1999, s. 135]. 
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Confession 1910 1920 1926 1934 1946 1992 2001 
Catholicism 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.8 – 0.6 0.6 
Protestantism 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 – 0.3 0.5 
Judaism 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.6 0.0 0.0 
Armenian-
-Gregorian 0.3 0.2 0.5 0.4 – 0.1 0.1 
Other 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.1 0.2 0.1 
No affiliation – – – – – – 3.9 
FUNDAMENTALISMS AND EUROINTEGRATION: THE CASE 
OF BULGARIA 
S u m m a r y  
Object of the study are contemporary manifestations of religious fundamentalism at the Balkans 
under conditions of concurrent eurointegration (the case of Bulgaria is considered in particular). 
Followed are the major synchronous and diachronous factors determining the specificity of funda-
mentalist phenomena in the context of the Balkans, Orthodoxy, and Europe. The conclusion is that 
both historical merits and current regulatory and legal realities suggest rather a peaceful picture of 
interconfessional communication. An attempt is made at getting behind the curtain of official political 
discourse where alarming trends toward religious intolerance are found both on the part of Islam and 
of the Orthodox Church. 
Secularism which is always inherent in the European talking on religious phenomena is conceived 
as inadequate and futureless in the interpretation of realities stageably existing in the „presecularity” 
of premodern time – like the Orthodoxy and Islam at the Balkans. 
